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Sunday Blue Laws: A New Hypocrisy
I. Introduction
The word Sabbath means rest: that is cessation from labor, but the stupid
Blue Laws of Connecticut make a labor of rest, for they oblige a person to
sit still from sunrise to sunset on a Sabbath day, which is hard work. Fanati-
cism made those laws, and hypocrisy pretends to reverence them for where
such laws prevail, hypocrisy will prevail also.'
The controversy involving Sunday Blue laws2 persists, and this charge of
hypocrisy made by Thomas Paine in 1804 is often repeated in twentieth-century
America by those who criticize these laws of religious origins that mandate a gen-
eral abeyance of commercial activity on Sunday. Most of the laws, however,
provide exemptions that allow certain commodities to be sold3 or certain busi-
nesses to remain open.'
Although Sunday Blue laws exist in over half of the states,' the cloak of
twentieth-century hypocrisy that enshrouds both legislative action and judicial
review prevents a true assessment of them. The purpose of this Note is to lift
that veil of hypocrisy and thereby to provide a foundation for an accurate
assessment of these laws. This task will initially involve an examination of the
varying standards of judicial review applied by the courts to determine the con-
stitutionality of the Blue laws. Such an analysis demonstrates that the constitu-
tional status of a particular closing statute is dependent upon the level of review
utilized by the court.
Secondly, the Note explores what may be the single most significant, yet most
frequently ignored, aspect of Sunday Blue laws-the influence of private eco-
nomic gain. Although the religious and social objectives of the Sunday Closing
statutes have often been discussed, few courts or commentators have acknowl-
edged these economic influences. Awareness of these influences, however, is a
prerequisite to intelligent discussion of Sunday Blue laws.
1 W. JOHNS, DATELINE SUNDAY, U.S.A. 31 (1967) (citing T. Paine, In God We Trust
PROSPECT PAPERS 432 (1804)).
2 The name derives from the theocratic Puritan legislation of the 17th century printed on
blue paper that regulated Sabbath conduct. Such laws are also known as Sunday Closing laws.
3 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 9(McKinney) (declared unconstitutional) that
provided in part:
All manner of public selling or offering for sale of any property on Sunday is
prohibited, except as follows .... 4. Prepared tobacco, bread, milk, eggs, ice, soda
water, fruit, flowers, confectionary, souvenirs, items of art and antiques, newspapers,
magazines, gasoline, oil, tires, cemetery monuments, drugs, medicine and surgical
instruments may be sold...
4 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 3204 that exempts "[sitores wherein no more than 5
persons, including the proprietor, are employed in the usual and regular conduct of business;
stores which have no more than 5009, square feet of interior customer selling space, excluding
back room storage, office and processing space."
5 N.Y. Times, May 22, 1976, § A, at 28, col. 3.
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II. Standards of Review
A. Historical Development
The original mandate of the Sunday Blue laws dates back to the Old Testa-
ment command that on the seventh day no work shall be done.6 As a result of
their undisputedly religious origins, such laws frequently had been challenged on
the ground that they violated the First Amendment provisions prohibiting the
establishment of religion.
These constitutional attacks on Sunday Blue laws culminated in the case of
McGowan v. Maryland7 in which the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland
statute that provided: "No person whatsoever shall work or do any bodily labor
on the Lord's Day, commonly called Sunday." However, an exception to the
statute allowed certain commodities to be sold.8 The Court found that although the
basic command of Sunday Blue laws had remained unchanged, in the evolution
of those laws a secular purpose had supplanted the original religious objectives.9
This underlying secular purpose, as articulated by the Court, is to "[p]rovide a
day of rest for all citizens."' ° The distinction between religious and civil purposes
has been a matter of controversy; nevertheless, the civil purpose has been uni-
versally accepted by the courts." Thus, as a result of McGowan, constitutional
attacks based upon religious grounds became futile.
In addition to the establishment argument asserted in McGowan, the
Maryland Blue law was also challenged on the ground that it violated the consti-
tutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. This challenge has retained
viability and is still asserted today. Sunday Blue laws, it is contended, violate the
equal protection guarantee by allowing selected commercial establishments to
remain open for business on Sunday while forbidding other similarly situated
businesses from doing so. For example, a Sunday Blue law might allow small
stores to do business while requiring larger stores to close."2 Further, stores
selling certain commodities might be allowed to conduct business while stores
selling other items are not permitted to operate." Because of these exceptions,
it is argued, Sunday Blue laws discriminate in favor of some businesses as against
others and thus violate the equal protection guarantee. Whether the law does
violate equal protection is determined by the use of one of two standards of
judicial review: "rational basis" analysis or the "substantially related" test.
6 "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day. Six days shalt thou labor, and
shalt do all thy work. But on the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: thou shall
do no work on it .... " Exodus 20:8 (New Catholic Edition).
7 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
8 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521.
9 The extent to which a civil purpose has replaced religious objectives remains a matter
of current controversy. See generally Note, The Blue Laws Revisited-1972, 36 ALB. L. R. 782
(1972); Note, A Wanton Gospeller Cries Out for Repeal of the Sunday Closing Law, 58
Ky. L.J. 275 (1970); Note, Sunday Closing Laws in the United States: An Unconstitutional
Anachronism, 11 SUFFOLKC U.L. R. 1089 (1977).
10 366 U.S. at 445.
11 E.g., Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 362 N.E.2d 878 (Mass. 1977); Rutledge v. Gay-
lord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Bertera's Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters,
428 Pa. 20, 236 A.2d 197 (1967); State v. S.S. Kresge, Inc., 364 A.2d 868 (Maine 1976).
12 See note 4 supra.
13 See note 3 supra.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
B. The Rational Basis Standard
The standard established by the Supreme Court in McGowan to determine
whether the legislation violated the equal protection provision turned on the
"rationality" of the challenged enactment. Accordingly, to pass constitutional
muster the classification must have a rational basis: "The constitutional safe-
guard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the state's objective." 14 This rational basis test requires that the
Sunday Closing law be rationally related to the statute's lawful purpose-a com-
mon day of rest. If this nexus between classification (here, the provision that a
few commodities could be sold) and purpose is extant, the statute will withstand
attacks based on the denial of equal protection. Not only does a presumption of
validity attach to the legislation,1" but, under this approach, the courts will uphold
a classification "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' 16
Thus, if any conceivable set of facts justifies the distinctions drawn by a Sunday
Blue law, a court utilizing the rational basis test will uphold the statute. More-
over, the judiciary itself is permitted to supply the reason why the legislature
rationally might have enacted specific exceptions to the Sunday Closing law. For
example, one law1" permitted flowers, plants, shrubs and trees to be sold. The
court found the sale of such items to have a rational basis to the legislative pur-
pose because "greenery, which is designed to be beautiful" would not increase
"crass commercialism to be eschewed on Sunday."18
This explanation exemplifies the reasoning process of many courts, a process
which has been described in a dissenting opinion as "an idyllic scenario wistfully
conjured to provide the 'rational basis' to justify classification."' 9 Not surprisingly,
then, the rational basis test has been criticized in Sunday Blue law litigation as
"toothless ' 2' because the standard is so easily satisfied that it serves no worth-
while function for review. A few courts, therefore, although verbally adhering
to the rational basis test, actually apply a methodologically stricter standard of
review: one that requires the legislation to "bear a real and substantial relation




C. The Substantially Related Test
The "substantially related" test imposes a more rigorous standard of review
than does the rational basis test."2 However, only a few courts apply the sub-
stantially related test and, further, some of these courts appear unwilling to con-
14 366 U.S. at 425.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 426.
17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-23-2.
18 Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250, 1260 (D.R.I.
1976).
19 Vorando, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 390 A.2d 606, 616 (1977) (Pashman, J., dis-
senting), appeal dismissed sub nom. Vorando, Inc. v. Degnan, 47 U.S.L.W. 3380 (1979).
20 417 F. Supp. at 1257. For a general discussion of the perceived weaknesses of the
rational basis test, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-89 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as TRIBE].
21 390 A.2d at 619 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
22 TRIBE, supra note 20, 1088.
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fess that they utilize a standard of review that is different from the one enunciated
in McGowan. Thus, these courts continue to pay lip service to the rational basis
test.
A primary example is People v. Abrahams 3 in which the New York Blue
law2 4 was declared unconstitutional. The law permitted only certain commodities
to be sold on Sunday. The defendant, however, had sold a ceramic bank in viola-
tion of the statute..2 5 An analysis of the court's reasoning supports the conclusion
that the New York Court of Appeals did not apply the rational basis standard as
it specifically purported to do; 2' rather, it employed the substantially related test.
Despite a finding of irrationality, the court, in essence, examined the degree to
which the statutory scheme fulfilled the legislative "day of rest" rationale. The
court found that the statute was "utterly lacking in cohesive scheme ' 27 because it
was comprised of a "haphazard and anachronistic amalgamation of exceptions."2
As a result of this lack of cohesiveness, the law was both unenforceable and popu-
larly flouted.2 In short, the statute was not substantially related to the achievement
of the "day of rest" rationale because it was not fulfilling that legislative objective.
Other courts also have applied a standard stricter than rational basis. In
Rutledge v. Gaylord's Inc.,"° the Supreme Court of Georgia declared unconsti-
tutional a Sunday Blue law2 ' that prohibited certain businesses from engaging in
sales on both Saturday and Sunday of any one weekend. Any business operating
on the two consecutive days was to be declared a public nuisance. Despite relying
on an earlier decision that employed a "reasonable relation" standard,3 2 the court
struck down this provison of the Act because it determined that the Act "nowhere
limits the operation of any business other than sales." 3 Since all other types of
activities could take place on Sunday, the law was not achieving the day of rest.
Recently the substantially related standard was employed by a lower Con-
necticut court34 in striking down the Connecticut Blue law.35 The court clearly
and openly applied the more rigorous test and found that the "law as enacted
does not bear a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be
accomplished .. ."36 The decision was based upon the fact that out of a total
labor force of 1,450,000 in Connecticut, 420,000 were prohibited from working
on Sunday. Over 900,000 workers, therefore, were exempt from the law. Thus,
the court concluded that "this statute does not in fact provide a common day of
rest."
23 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1976).
24 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 9 (McKinney) (declared unconstitutional).
25 40 N.Y.2d at 280, 353 N.E.2d at 575, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
26 Id. at 284, 353 N.E.2d at 578, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
27 Id. at 285, 353 N.E.2d at 578, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975).
31 Ga. Code §§ 96-1201 to 96-1208 (declared unconstitutional).
32 233 Ga. at 698, 213 S.E.2d at 629 (citing Hughes v. Reynolds, 223 Ga. 727, 131, 157
S.E.2d 746, 749 (1967).
33 233 Ga. at 697, 213 S.E.2d at 629.
34 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1978, § B, at 1, col. 6.
35 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53302a (West), as amended by 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts.
No. 78-329.




These courts have invalidated Sunday Blue laws because they were not sub-
stantially related to the state's objective of a day of rest. Application of the
rational basis test, however, would have rendered a different result. An examina-
tion of various rational basis decisions shows the standards of review to be result
determinative-the rational basis test dictates constitutional validity while the
substantially related test is fatal.
D. Standards of Review as Outcome-Determinative Tests
The difference in results obtained by the use of the two tests can be demon-
strated by comparing Abrahams with Zayre v. Attorney General.8 In Zayre, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the numerous exceptions to the
Sunday Closing law' 9 -similar in substance to those of the New York Statute
struck down in Abrahams-did not result in an unconstitutional law. The court,
relying on McGowan, clearly applied the rational basis test when it said that as
long "as the particular exemptions have a rational basis consistent with the
statutory purposes they will pass constitutional muster."4 Unlike the New York
court, the Massachusetts court refused to examine the legislative scheme as a
whole; rather, it focused on each individual exemption and found each to have
a rational basis.4
The court justified its decision by relying on Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in McGowan42 regarding the necessity of exceptions:
Not all activity can halt on Sunday. Some of the very operations whose
doing must contribute to the rush and clamor of the week must go on
throughout that day as well, whether because the cost of stopping and re-
starting them is simply too great, or because to be without their services
would be more disruptive of peace than to have them continue.4 3
The Massachusetts court then utilized the prerogative granted it by the
rational basis test to provide reasons to justify the legislative action. For example,
the court determined that "the legislature may have reasoned that people needed
access to such suppliers and that stores primarily engaged in selling such supplies
would not present a great threat to the public order of the day." 44 Under the
substantially related test, on the other hand, such hypothesizing cannot occur.
The court simply must make a substantive evaluation of the relationship between
the statute itself and the legislative goal it purports to advance.
In Vorando, Inc. v. Hyland, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a
lower Superior Court decision" and upheld a general closing law 7 proscribing
38 362 N.E.2d 878 (Mass. 1977).
39 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 136, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op).
40 362 N.E.2d at 887.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 885.
43 366 U.S. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44 362 N.E.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
45 390 A.2d at 606.
46 148 N.J. Super. 343, 372 A.2d 667 (1977).
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 171-5.8 to 5.18 (West).
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the sale of five categories of items. The lower court had found that the Sunday
Blue law "fails to advance the opportunity of the general public for recreation,
diversion and leisure on Sunday, and, moreover, affirmatively impedes and
interferes with that opportunity.""8  Thus the lower court, in effect, had
applied a substantially related test. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed
on the ground that the classifications "bore some relation"4 9 to the legislative
objective, and, therefore, the rational basis test was satisfied even though the
"legislative objective might be more fully achieved by another, more expansive
classification."5
Use of this same "some relation" standard of rationality explains why the
Supreme Court of Texas in Gibson Products Inc. v. State51 upheld a law52 that
was even less restrictive (that is, allowed more commercial activity) than the
Georgia law declared unconstitutional in Rutledge.5 3 The Georgia law pro-
hibited certain businesses from operating on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays
while the Texas law prohibited only the sale of certain items on those days. The
Texas court, applying the rational basis test, found that the prohibition was ra-
tionally related to the day of rest, and, therefore, constitutional.5 4
E. Considerations Influencing Judicial Review
Although the levels of review establish principled standards by which the
courts may test legislation, these standards are flexible and thus enable judges to
inculcate the jurisprudential function with their own personal values regarding
the desirability of the Sunday Blue law under review. An assessment of the
standards of review utilized to test Sunday Blue laws would not be complete
without a cursory glance at these extra-judicial considerations, which some courts
openly admit influence their decisions.
The Massachusett court in Zayre said: "It seems clear to us that the sub-
stantial differences in history, experience and statutory structure, as well as the
record before a court makes each decision one which is the peculiar responsibility
of the state court before which such an issue is raised." 5 This approach allows
the courts to examine a wide variety of concerns: enforceability of the statute;"6
respect for the law;" voluntary compliance with the law;" prosecutorial indiffer-
ence; 9 popular disdain for the prohibitions of the state;6" community inap-
petence for the statute's enforcement;61 increase in litigation;6" increase in con-
48 148 N.J. Super. at 353, 372 A.2d at 671-72.
49 390 A.2d at 612.
50 Id. at 606.
51 545 S.W.2d 128 (Texas 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977).
52 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon).
53 See text accompanying notes 30 to 32 supra.
54 545 S.W.2d at 129-30.
55 362 N.E.2d at 886.
56 40 N.Y.2d at 285, 353 N.E.2d at 578, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 285, 353 N.E.2d at 578, 386 .N.Y.S.2d at 666.
59 Id. at 285, 353 N.E.2d at 579, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
60 Id. at 285-86, 353 N.E.2d at 579, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
61 Id. at 286, 353 N.E.2d at 579, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
62 Id. at 284, 353 N.E.2d at 577, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
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sumer prices; 3 forcing employees to work on Sunday;4 and the economic
realities of forcing reluctant businessmen to open on Sunday."
Whether a law is rationally related or substantially related to the legislative
purpose is a matter of degree, and, therefore, the tests are susceptible to extra-
judicial considerations. A judge's perception of a statute, as influenced by these
external considerations, can greatly influence his ultimate decision regarding the
constitutionality of the law. One extrajudicial concern, however, has been
virtually ignored by the courts-the private economic influences that pervade
the entire spectrum of Sunday Blue laws.
III. Economic Influences
The historical development of Sunday Blue law legislation presents an
intriguing amalgamation of religious, social and economic interests. Although
"it is difficult to unravel the weave of interests caught by this legislation," 6 this
amalgamation must, nevertheless, be recognized in order to more fully under-
stand the controversy surrounding Sunday Blue laws. Unfortunately, courts and
commentators have largely ignored the cognizable economic interests that
permeate these laws.
Economic interests have stealthily supplanted the social objectives of a day
of rest. These interests permeate not only the initial enactment stage of the
closing legislation but also both the passage of specific exemptions thereto and the
subsequent enforcement of the law. Hypocrisy prevails, however, and courts
adamantly refuse to evaluate these interests. Murmurs of discontent found
both in lower court decisions and in concurring and dissenting opinions indicate
the extent to which economic interests have impinged upon the day of rest ra-
tionale adhered to by the courts. Slowly the veil of hypocrisy is being raised.
The pervasiveness of economic influences is exemplified by the Connecticut
statute recently declared unconstitutional."r The statute was amended in 197868
to permit stores to operate on those Sundays that fall between Thanksgiving and
Christmas. Because the social objectives of a day of rest are no less important
on those few Sundays, the law obviously compromises social values for the sake
of economic interests.
It is for the sake of economic interests that, when a closing law is declared
unconstitutional, a new one is enacted. Political columnists note that such laws
are legislated at the behest of businesses that operate unprofitably on Sunday
but are compelled by economic realities to do so because their competitors are
doing business. 9 This fact was recognized as early as 1964 in a sharply worded
63 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A.2d 200, 203 (1976).
64 390 A.2d at 611.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 624 (Handler, J., dissenting).
67 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-302a (West), as amended by 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts. No.
78-329.
68 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts. No. 78-329.
69 Very often the decision to have a Sunday Closing is the result of lobbying by economic
concerns. "[O]wners of smaller stores, who wanted to stay closed on Sunday but were open-
ing to meet the competition from the large chain stores, began a vigorous lobbying campaign
to bring back the Sunday ban." N.Y. Times, July 7, 1977, § B, at 6, col. 4.
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concurring opinion stating that the real purpose of the Nebraska Blue law was
"to protect narrow commercial interests, influenced by the fierce competition
between the discount store and the downtown merchant."7
Courts, however, refuse to evaluate these considerations even when pre-
sented in the litigation. The 1978 case of Gibson Distrib. Co., v. Downtown Dev.
Assoc. of El Paso, Inc." serves as an example. The Sunday Closing law in ques-
tion prohibited the sale of certain items on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays."2
It was argued that the state's right to regulate sales had been preempted by the
Sherman Antitrust Act.73 Although the court found the state action to be exempt
from the federal antitrust laws, it acknowledged that "The argument that the
'Sunday Closing statute' was intended to benefit certain merchants over other
merchants ... is not new . . .,7 The court, however, refused to discuss this
contention.
The day of rest rationale is also compromised by the numerous exceptions
enacted in response to the lobbying of private economic interest groups. This
legislation by private groups was noted in the concurring opinion in People v.
Abrahams: "It is apparent that [the classifications] are, rather, a hodgepodge of
unrelated exceptions legislated at the instance of whichever interest groups were
best able to bring their views to the legislature's attention. . .. ,7' The majority,
however, specifically refused to address the issue."6
Economic motivations are also a prominent influence on enforcement pro-
ceedings and litigation. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals said in
Abrahams that the "spasmodic promulgation of exceptions" has served as a
catalyst to generate a corresponding increase in constitutional litigation.
Further, in 1971 a lower New York court articulated the link between economic
motivation and enforcement when it found that "the only motivation for this
prosecution was the effort of the Syracuse Chamber of Commerce to lessen the
defendant's competitive advantage in the business community derived from its
suburban location." 7
Finally, the degree to which economic interests have replaced the day of rest
rationale is demonstrated by examining a decision of the New York Court of
Appeals. In People v. Acme Markets, Inc.,79 decided before Abrahams, the court
found discriminatory enforcement of the closing law and ordered the dismissal
of several informations filed against supermarkets for violations of that statute.
The court concluded: "Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that enforcement
"Fundamentally it is an argument between some big merchants who find Sunday profitable
and want the right to remain open and some big merchants who don't and resent the com-
petitive pressure to open anyway." N.Y. Times, July 6, 1977, § A, at 18, col. 1.
70 Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475, 482-83 (1964)
(Carter, J., concurring).
71 572 S.W.2d 334 (1978), appeal dismissed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3380 (1978.)
72 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon).
73 572 S.W.2d at 335.
74 Id.
75 40 N.Y.2d at 292, 353 N.E.2d at 583, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 670 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
76 40 N.Y.2d at 283 n. 4, 353 N.E.2d at 577 n. 4, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 664 n.4.
77 Id. at 284, 353 N.E.2d at 577, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
78 People v. Fay's Drug Co. of Fairmont, 68 Misc.2d 143, 326 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1971).
79 37 N.Y.2d 326, 334 N.E.2d 555, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1975).
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has been totally surrendered to private parties and interest groups who without
constraint may manipulate the law for purely private purposes."8
This manipulation of the law for purely private purposes is found through-
out the entire legislative process of the Sunday Blue laws. Such private manipu-
lation motivates the initial passage of the statutes and then surfaces again when
specific exceptions to the general closing mandate are enacted. Furthermore,
Acme Markets and Abrahams illustrate the private manipulation of even the
enforcement of these laws. Courts should throw off the veil of hypocrisy under
which such private economic concerns have remained and examine the full
extent of these influences. Only then can Sunday Blue laws be evaluated
realistically.
IV. Conclusion
The hypocrisy surrounding Sunday Blue laws has inhibited intelligent dis-
cussion while producing only confusion. Two observations are helpful in under-
standing controversies involving Sunday Blue laws. First, the standard of
judicial review may vary from court to court despite repeated assurances that the
rational basis test is being applied.
Second, controversy over Sunday Blue laws arises because conflicting
interests are affected by the legislation. Private economic interests are most
prominent and exert tremendous influence over the enactment and enforcement
aspects of the closing statutes. These private economic purposes must be closely
scrutinized in each state and the pervasiveness of these economic motivations
must be fully examined. Legislators, courts and commentators must question
whether the social "day of rest" objective of the Sunday Blue laws retains any
viability today, or whether private economic concerns have replaced the social
objectives, just as the social objectives earlier replaced the religious ones. If it is
found that private economic interests do indeed predominate, then to allow these
laws to exist under the guise of promoting a common day of rest demonstrates
that the hypocrisy which Thomas Paine so vehemently argued against is still
present today.
Daniel Otto, Flanagan
80 Id. at 331, 334 N.E.2d at 558, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
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